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Abstract: Max Scheler’s phenomenology of reli-
gion aimed at a renewed philosophical approach to
the problem of God, willing to unify the modern
need for a personalization of religion with the tradi-
tional objectivism and realism which, ever since the
days of Thomas Aquinas, had been basic for Catho-
licism. For this purpose, Scheler argued for a return
to an original level of the experience which could
enable a new approach to the religious phenome-
non, which could consider it at the level of a «living
evidence», answering to the exigence of realism for
which phenomenological philosophy was calling,
thereby founding an original natural theology.
Keywords: Scheler, Phenomenology, Natural
Theology.
Resumen: La fenomenología de la religión desa-
rrollada por Scheler apuntaba a un renovado acer-
camiento filosófico a la cuestión de Dios; su inten-
ción era unificar la moderna necesidad de una
personalización de la religión con el objetivismo y el
realismo tradicional que, desde los tiempos de To-
más de Aquino, habían sido básicos para el catoli-
cismo. Para este propósito, Scheler abogó por un
retorno a un nivel original de la experiencia que pu-
diera permitir un nuevo acercamiento al fenómeno
religioso, así respondiendo a la exigencia del realis-
mo que estaba reclamando la filosofía fenomeno-
lógica, y fundando de este modo una original teo-
logía natural.
Palabras clave: Scheler, Fenomenología, Teología
natural.
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I n the scene of the post-war German philosophy, Max Scheler played a car-dinal role, showing an openness to the contradictory currents of that timeand trying to speak to the contemporary needs of European man by way of
original and consistent phenomenology of religion. His main work in the phi-
losophy of religion, On the Eternal in Man, written between 1917-1921, re-
presents one of the first philosophical reflections on the trauma of World War
I. The originality of his attempt consists in proposing to restore the rich tra-
dition of Catholic philosophical thought, insisting at the same time on the ne-
cessity of a religious renewal – not a nostalgic renewal, but a forward-looking
one.
The philosophical situation of those years was characterized, as long as
it concerned religious thought, by a dispute between modernist movements
and the opposite position of the Catholic Church. The latter, clinging to the
fundamentals of Scholastic philosophy, had remained rather antagonistic to-
wards the results of the former – which, assimilating the instances of the re-
cent philosophy of life (Henri Bergson) or philosophy of action (Maurice
Blondel), tried to adapt the traditional dogmatic and metaphysical items to
the ever-changing historical conditions of spiritual life. If some modern
thinkers were endorsing a religious philosophy that could have its starting
point in the exigencies of subjective life, the Catholic Church paralleled
them by continuing a revival of Thomism – particularly symbolized by the
encyclical Aeterni Patris of Leo XIII, in which the pope recommended the
metaphysical system of Thomas Aquinas as the standard philosophy of Ca-
tholicism.
This contested ground was the preliminary situation out of which Sche-
ler’s phenomenology of religion grew. In considering these two big branches
of the Catholic and philosophical thought of the period, Scheler’s pursuit
aimed at a renewed philosophical approach to the problem of God, willing to
unify the modern need for a personalization of religion with the traditional
objectivism and realism which, ever since the days of Thomas Aquinas, had
been basic for official Catholicism. Traditional realism meant concretely that
«the existence of God was no less certain than the existence of the external
world» 1: Deus est maxime cognoscibilis. The recognizability of God through
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reason, as well as the doubtless acceptance of revelation as the foundation of
knowledge and certitude, were the essential marks of Catholic philosophy.
The living unity of reason and revelation therefore did not require an inde-
pendent, but only a subsequent, justification of the assumption of religious
objects.
That things changed with modernity is well known. The first big eman-
cipation of philosophical thinking from natural revelation and from a realistic
method in the knowledge of reality had already begun with Descartes, who, in
opposition to a Scholastic concept of truth – according to which veritas est
adaequatio intellectus et rei – developed an idea of truth as what is «clearly and
distinctly perceived» 2. This meant basically an overturning of the perspective:
if, before, truth was conceived as an adaptation of the intellect to given mate-
rial, now it is the givenness itself that has to fit into previously defined crite-
ria: in this way the precise conditions of «accessibility» of every possible ob-
ject of knowledge are established. Another fundamental step in the genesis of
modern thought – as Scheler himself notes – was accomplished by Kant, who
did nothing else than reaching the conclusions drawn by Descartes 3, as he
proclaimed the separation of knowledge and faith, banishing the knowledge
of God from the realm of theoretical reason to the realm of practical reason.
With his work Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant dissolved classi-
cal metaphysics into a «rationalistic religion», where the ideas of God, soul,
and freedom became postulates: denying that God can be the object of theo-
retical cognition, he nonetheless asserted that He is an indispensable postula-
te for any satisfactory grounding of morality and theoretical science.
Consequently, what historically (i.e. philosophically) happened was that
Schleiermacher operated a transfer of the religious element into the extra-
rational sphere of «feeling», which separated the kernel of religious truth
from every possible theoretical and ethical access.
These historical premises undoubtedly led to the cultural situation of the
20th century and generated both the reaction and the annexed backlash of
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3 It is impossible at this point to quote the entire list of fundamental authors, who through their
philosophy generated an increasingly distance between faith and knowledge. It would be enough
to cite Spinoza, who in his Tractatus theologico-politicus assigns knowledge to the exclusive realm
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has the task to regulate common, political life.
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modernism, on the one hand, and of the Church, on the other – i.e. the com-
plementary necessities of the «subjective» and «objective» elements of reli-
gion. The phenomenological movement, which began at the advent of the
century, should therefore be considered as a fruitful answer to the circums-
tances of the time.
1. PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD AND EVIDENCE
IN (RELIGIOUS) EXPERIENCE
Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, had inherited from
Franz Brentano the appreciation of the Scholastic achievements in the fields
of logic and theory of knowledge, and had thereby promoted among his fo-
llowers an interest in a renaissance of this philosophical tradition. Even if
Husserl’s philosophy itself was in principle indifferent to the theological im-
plications of its method 4, its logical and at the same time realistic connotations
– in the proper sense of the inaugural motto of the movement as a «return to
things themselves» – could not help but awaken among some of his pupils the
question about transcendence and its possible philosophical elaboration. In
contrast to Kant and in accordance with Scholastic philosophy, Husserl had
emphasized that objects of consciousness are not spontaneously formed by the
subject, but are given as structural, ideal unity. Phenomenology assumed from
its very beginning the task of proceeding on a possible, purely descriptive le-
vel – meaning without presuppositions (in vollkommenster Voraussetzungslösig-
keit) – to be able to interrogate in their «bodily selfhood» (leibhaftigen Selbs-
theit) the «how» of the givenness of phenomena, which are as such given to
consciousness. From this beginning, observation became the basic attitude of
the phenomenologist. To this effect Husserl called for a floating attention or
a relaxation of the intensity of attention: what appears to be intuition must be
taken as it appears and within the limits in which it appears; any further truth
will emerge from this beginning 5. So says Husserl in Ideen: «Every statement
which does no more than confer expression on such data by simple explication
and by means of significations precisely conforming to them is (...) actually an
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4 Cfr. ALES BELLO, A., The divine in Husserl and Other Explorations, Analecta Husserliana, vol.
XCVIII, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2008.
5 BALABAN, O., «Epoché: Meaning, Object and Existence», in TYMIENIECKA, A.-T. (ed.), Pheno-
menology World-Wide, Foundation – Expanding Dynamics – Life-Engagements, Analecta-Husserlia-
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06. Piazza Estudio  30/03/2021  11:01  Página 102
absolute beginning called upon to serve as a foundation, a principium in the ge-
nuine sense of the word» 6.
According to this, Husserl claimed for a new understanding of eviden-
ce. The word «evidence», rooted in the Latin evidens (an adjective meaning
«evident» in the sense of «visible», «clear» or «plain to see»), derives, as a
compound, from the preposition e (meaning «from») and the verb videre
(«to see»). Not by chance therefore, Descartes’ definition became central, as
«clear and distinction perception» (clara et distincta perceptio), that, as men-
tioned, became the criterion of his definition of truth. Although Husserl was
quite explicit regarding his philosophical debt to Descartes, especially in his
philosophical project of a radical «beginning» 7 and the will to establish a
scientific system of knowledge based on pure consciousness, he gave a step
in his comprehension of evidence: while Descartes’ concept of a definite,
omnipotent and self-structuring evidence indicated a «seeing» (perceiving)
something without any doubt, in Husserl this concept does not have an apo-
dictic certainty; in fact, by correlating the concepts of evidence and expe-
rience 8, Husserl’s evidence «loses» Descartes’ decisive character, as it beco-
mes mediated by possible corrections and deviations in the course of the
experience.
This understanding of evidence and experience (as not reducible to em-
pirical data, but as an open field of Wesensmöglichkeiten) – as Hedwig Conrad-
Martius, a woman phenomenologist from the Husserl circle, was recognizing
– would open the door to a category of possibility that would be central for
the interpretation of the religious phenomenon 9: the concept of evidence as
a fulfillment of an intention (for example the religious intention – der religiö-
se Akt), and the idea of an intuitive knowledge of essential facts were indeed
important philosophical premises for the foundation of a new metaphysical
realism.
Nevertheless, precisely understood as the fulfillment of an intentional
act, the idea of evidence in Husserl became circumscribed to the operative
consciousness, being in fact a form of it. Evidence is an act of consciousness
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7 Cfr. MACDONALD, P., Descartes and Husserl. The philosophical Project of Radical Beginnings, Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2000.
8 ÖKTEM, Ü., «Husserl’s Evidence Problem», Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 9 (2009) 3.
9 Cfr. CONRAD-MARTIUS, H., «Vorwort», in REINACH, A., Was ist Phänomenologie?, München: Kö-
sel, 1951.
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which gives (presents) a thing, bringing about an intentional experience; in
this sense, although it necessarily maintains a teleological character, it emer-
ges as a concept which refers to the constitutive consciousness and its inten-
tionality: it being linked to intentionality in the sense that the phenomenal
character of originary givenness discloses the nature of evidence, intentiona-
lity itself is understood by Husserl as «[what] characterizes consciousness in
the pregnant sense of the term, and justifies us in describing the whole stream
of experience as at once a stream of consciousness and unity of one cons-
ciousness» 10.
According to this methodological principle, therefore, the question of
transcendence stricto sensu, to which Husserl’s approach seemed open, ended
in a metaphysical absolutization of consciousness, necessarily resulting from
the phenomenological «concentration» upon it. Moreover, as a science of
pure phenomena, Husserl’s phenomenology, being interested in the pheno-
menal character of its objects, was furnishing an adequate approach for aes-
thetics, but was not offering an appropriate method for investigating other le-
vels of reality. Indeed, as a science of essences, phenomenology was leaving
aside the problem of the effectual reality of the given object, as well as their
transcendence to consciousness.
As Hafkesbrink notices, the fact that there are objects which are given to
consciousness «as real» did not convince Husserl of the actual reality of the-
se objects, because for him the givenness of reality never is part of their true
essence (Ausserbewusste dingliche Existenz ist nie eine durch die Gegebenheit als
notwendig geforderte, sondern in gewisser Art immer zufällig 11). Reality would be
also attributed to things through an act of sense-giving on the part of subjec-
tive consciousness. In order to find the essence and discover the mode of gi-
venness Husserl introduced therefore the «phenomenological reduction», an
operation that, changing the naïve attitude of man towards the world in every-
day experience, brackets out the quality of reality and suspends all positing of
reality.
No matter what the thing is – object or subject – a phenomenological
perspective holds in abeyance the pre-posited, pre-supposed acceptance of
being, allowing one to comport him or herself differently, from a changed at-
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titude, focusing now on how it appears, the modes of giving and the multifa-
rious ways of meaning-accepting 12.
This, at length, drew a line between the master and his disciples; the
transcendence which Husserl had established for the objects of consciousness
was – as some of his pupils pointed out – not real transcendence, but a mere
«immanent objectivity». This raised in fact the question about the ontological
status of the external world as of every possible object given to consciousness
(memories, phantasy, and eventually God). Some of his pupils, for example
Moritz Geiger, started to claim a preference for a Gegenstandsphänomenologie
over an Aktphenomenologie which, according to him, was the genuine Husser-
lian approach 13. Among the phenomenologists of the Munich circle, Scheler
in particular worked out an important thesis for the foundation of a new me-
taphysical realism 14, which functioned as a decisive basis for the later elabora-
tion of his natural theology.
Scheler intended to take advantage of Husserl’s method by approa-
ching the religious phenomenon at a pure, descriptive level, namely by sho-
wing «essential facts». As seen in Husserl’s method, reality has to be
brought to self-givenness in immediate, intuitive evidence in those very
structures and contents which both every day and scientific cognition leave
unconsidered. Scheler in this regard assumed but also refined the theory of
his master. He took into account the capacity and the role of phenomeno-
logical experience in his earlier phenomenological works, Phänomenologie
und Erkenntnistheorie (1913-14) and Lehre von den drei Tatsachen (1911-12),
where he confronted in particular the two other kinds of experience men-
tioned, typical for the modern man: the scientific, and naïve, every-day ex-
perience.
As Scheler affirms: if on the one hand every-day experience lets only tho-
se aspects of the world which are of some practical, biological importance
emerge, then, on the other hand, scientific experience tends to encapsulate
reality in a system of symbols which could be of universal conventionality and
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Kritik», Kant-Studien 38 (1933) 321-383.
13 GEIGER, M., Methodologische und experimentelle Beiträge zur Quantitätslehre, Leipzig: Engelmann,
1907, 355.
14 This is particularly to be seen in his major work, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Va-
lues (1913-14), where the philosopher grounds a new ethical objectivism founded in objective,
independent, value-qualities.
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communicability. Both world views also seem unable to grasp the pure facts or
quality which only the phenomenological consideration – in Scheler’s opinion
a loving, disinterested consideration of things – can bring to light. This new
phenomenological attitude, which in Scheler’s philosophy assumes a more
comprehensive, moral meaning compared with Husserl’s theoretical approach,
would be all the more necessary because of the prejudice that modernity
would enhance with respect to what counts as original, evidential experience.
For the modern thinker, only those experiences that can be proven in a ratio-
nal or logical manner, or that fit into some prearranged criteria, can be true
and taken into account. This would have a clear impact on the ordinary un-
derstanding of religious phenomena. The prejudice is not that matters of faith
or religious experience are not meaningful, but that they are not accessible to
critical investigation.
According to Scheler the fundamental misunderstanding concerning this
matter consists in the presumption of applying to the religious sphere criteria
borrowed from other fields, for instance the empirical criteria of sensory per-
ception; instead, Scheler declares that religious objects are given through a
kind of evidence that is as originative as the religious acts themselves. Thus, re-
ligious evidence should not be brought back to other kinds of evidence, like
scientific or even metaphysical evidence, in the same measure that faith can-
not be deduced from philosophical theology. This would be as contradictory
as the attempt to demonstrate the existence of colors before seeing them, or
of sounds before hearing them, affirms the philosopher. Thus, to suggest that
the divine is a peculiar mode of givenness is to say that it is given to the per-
son in a unique manner that is wholly distinct from perceived objects or ra-
tional judgments. The attempt to describe the essential characteristics of his
revelation – in the broad sense – assumes that revelation has its own particu-
lar sense of lawfulness. For example, Adolf Reinach, another phenomenolo-
gist from the Munich circle, recognized quite early on (1916) that religious ex-
periences have their own integrity. From the perspective of perceptual
experience, of course, religious experiences can neither be «understood», nor
considered «motivated» 15; but this indicates all the more the necessity to res-
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(ed.), Oxford University Press’s Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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pect the sense that religious experiences have of their own accord, «even if
[their sense] leads to enigmas» 16.
As Steinbock notes, it would be a sign of capriciousness to assume that
one must equate «experience» and «presence» with what he calls the «pre-
sentation» of object – that is, with a «having» of things, perceptually or epis-
temically, or with an accomplishment initiated by the self. In fact, Husserl
himself was assuming «presentation» as the proper operative model of given-
ness, a type of givenness which is more or less dependent upon the subject’s
power to usher things into appearance, either through the «I can» or the «I
think»; but, «it is an insidious form of positivism to force all experience into
the noesis-noematic logic of appearance and fulfilment under the rubric of
being true to “evidence”» 17. Moreover, as will be analyzed, Scheler’s under-
standing of an evidence proper to the religious sphere, which he calls the epis-
temological principle of self-evidence (ein Prinzip religionstheoretischer Evi-
denz), will imply an investigation about the objectivity of the external agent –
differently from Husserl’s concept, which focuses on the fulfillment of the in-
tention without asking about the actual reality of the «cause» of this fulfill-
ment. This accounts for a religious phenomenological realism and allows the
foundation of a natural theology.
2. THE FOUNDATION OF A NATURAL THEOLOGY – LOVE AND REVELATION
On the basis of these premises, Scheler argues for a return to the origi-
nal level of the experience which could enable a new approach to religion, so
that it could be finally released from the divisions and reductions dominating
modern society 18. Scheler takes into account two significant exponents of the
genesis of modern religious thought: criticizing Kant and Schleiermacher in
respect of rationalism and subjectivism ruling in matters of religion, Scheler
expresses the urgency of building up a natural theology, where reason and its
«acts» can be interrogated anew with a phenomenological approach devoid of
presupposition.
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18 Scheler pinpointed among others two kind of «reductions» of religion generated in modern
thought, namely «Gnosticism», where the faith is dissolved into metaphysical knowledge, and
«traditionalism», where conversely the possibility of rational knowledge of God is completely
deferred to religious doctrine.
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Therefore, in the first preface to his major work on religion, On the
Eternal in Man, Scheler declares that «the bases for the systematic construc-
tion of a “natural theology”» will be «more assured than traditional bases
and also of a nature to encounter a deeper understanding and sounder ap-
preciation from the man of today than the traditional systems of religious
theory which lean either to Aquinas or to Kant and Schleiermacher» 19. In
particular, according to Scheler, «In the same way as what Kant called the
“scandal of philosophy”, it is a scandal of theology and philosophy alike that
the questions of natural theology, i.e. the very thing designed to unite minds
irrespective of sectarian differences, should divide minds even more deeply
than points of confessional dogma» 20. Scheler calls again for a new method
in the study of the religious phenomenon, which taking advantage of the
most propitious philosophical approach in history, could consider it at the le-
vel of a «living evidence», answering to the exigence of realism that pheno-
menology was calling for, and thereby restoring to it an essential dimension
that the «accretions of history» have caused it to lose. Particularly, he affirms
that the task of this new philosophy of religion – natural theology – can be
performed in getting back the lost truths of Saint Augustine, namely «only
once it has delivered the kernel of Augustinism from the husk-like accretions
of history and employed phenomenological philosophy to provide it with a
fresh and more deeply rooted foundation» 21. This would basically mean, as
mentioned, a return to experience in its essential elements – what can even-
tually open to religious experience as such. As Scheler says, «only a theology
of the essential experience of divinity can open our eyes to the lost truths of
Augustine» 22. Following Rodríguez Duplá, it has to be mentioned that Sche-
ler’s philosophy of religion not only starts from, but also overcomes Augus-
tine’s one. In fact, Scheler assumes a critical position towards Augustine’s on-
tologism and Platonism, according to which man’s spirit would know the
essences of the world things as «situated» in the divine spirit 23. Nevertheless,
Scheler praises and assumes in his philosophy Augustine’s conceptual un-
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23 Cfr. RODRÍGUEZ DUPLÁ, L., «El problema del ateísmo en la filosofía de la religión de Max Sche-
ler», Estudios Trinitarios 44, 3 (2010) 372-376.
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derstanding of the basic Christian experience of the relation between love
and knowledge.
As he affirms in his homonym work Love and Knowledge, love, according
to Augustine – the taking of an interest – is the most essential tendency of the
human spirit. «Indeed, in the final analysis love, for Augustine, is directed not
towards happiness as a feeling, but toward the “holy”» 24. The objects of know-
ledge, the «images», are a consequence of a «question» asked with love: the
world answers and in so doing reveals itself. In this revelation the world co-
mes to its full existence and value. «Thus, for Augustine, the coming into
being of the “natural” knowledge of the world, viewed solely according to its
objective condition, yields the “revelatory character” that bypasses the con-
cept of “natural revelation”» 25.
From these passages it emerges how Scheler calls again for an affecti-
ve knowledge of reality that could possibly be open to religious experience.
Therefore, the first fundamental step in the development of natural theo-
logy will be calling attention to the natural revelation, meaning the presen-
tation and manifestation of the divine in things, events and orders which be-
long to the natural reality, accessible in principle to all 26. Scheler specifies
that speaking about revelation does not imply what positive theologians
calls «the revelation», but principally the specific manner in which any kind
of data relating to an object of divine and holy nature is received into the
mind via observation or experience – a kind of cognition which would stay
in contrast to all spontaneous cognitive acts 27; this is not about distinguishing
two different modalities of causality by which knowledge can enter into the
mind, but rather recognizing a peculiar mode of evidence-forming which is
latent in the observable cognitive processes and basically different from all
other modes.
According to this, it can be noticed that the mode of givenness of the
natural revelation, in German Offenbarung, precisely represents the alterna-
tive of Offenbarkeit (manifestation, or presentation, as above mentioned),
that kind of givenness correlated to spontaneous cognitive acts: Scheler is
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Knowing, Valuing, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992, 161.
25 Ivi, 164.
26 SCHELER, M., On the Eternal, 161.
27 Ivi, 147.
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able to assume this, inter alia, because he assumes a broader order of eviden-
ce than that of theoretical reason, which he calls an «order of the heart».
Going back to Pascal’s «le coeur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît point» 28,
he speaks about the existence of an ordo amoris in man, which, far from being
a «subjectively human» matter of fact 29, possesses its own unique logic, and
defines man not primarily as a knowing or willing being, but as an ens
amans 30.
As the philosopher furthermore explains, if natural revelation is one es-
sential stage of study, another one must be positive revelation – namely the case
where the divine, the «godly», is a being taking the form of personality. «For
if the divine reveals itself in some way at all levels of being, it reveals different
characteristics of its essence on different levels, and reveals itself with different
degrees of adequacy» 31. This would be the case in which the divine presents
or announces itself through the medium of the word and through persons –
«homines religiosi in the most eminent sense» 32.
What now it is important to our argument is that the various forms of re-
velation are grasped by various forms of religious act, which represents the se-
cond step in the phenomenology of religion – fundamental for the foundation
of the phenomenological religious realism and the natural theology we are
describing.
3. RELIGIOUS ACT: KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RELIGIOUS REALISM AS NATURAL THEOLOGY
In the second preface of On the Eternal in Man Scheler had clarified his
purpose of a «genuinely unified, essentially supra-confessional philosophy,
concerning the nature of religion and the true seat and origin of religious
knowledge in “religious acts”, of an “original religious experience irreducible
ANNA PIAZZA
110 SCRIPTA THEOLOGICA / VOL. 53 / 2021
28 PASCAL, B., Pensées, Brunschvicg: Garnier, 1964, art. IV, 277.
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30 It can be affirmed, with Fernández Beites, that what is at stake here is an «enlarged» concept of
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the volitive and the affective one. Cfr. FERNÁNDEZ BEITE, P., «Max Scheler y la posibilidad de
una “teología fenomenológica”», Revista Española de Teología 68 (2008) 2.
31 SCHELER, M., On the Eternal, 161.
32 Ibid.
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in terms of the secular empirical”» 33. Showing his stratified understanding
of human nature, Scheler presents a Fundierungsordnung 34 of spiritual acts (of
cognition, love, hate, will...). As mentioned, emotional acts appear to be at the
very center, coming before any kind of theoretical – perceptive or epistemic –
acts (corresponding to Scheler’s a priori hierarchy of values modality). It is
possible to affirm that the religious acts (although Scheler never defines this
with precision), being correlative to the emotional ones, resides at the core of
the act’s hierarchy: as analyzed, love opens to the very essence of things and to
that kind of experience proper to the natural revelation, so it is possible, again,
to affirm a strict correspondence in Scheler between affective and religious
knowledge.
Nevertheless, Scheler presents religious consciousness as a set of unique
sui generis acts, identifiable through specific features 35. Therefore, phenome-
nological (religious) consideration appears to be directed to these acts which
reveal – thanks to their essential characteristic – the presence and the nature
of the divine. It has to be stressed that already in the earlier text Absolutsphäre
und Realsetzung der Gottesidee (1915-16) Scheler spoke about the «natural»
existence of an absolute sphere (Absolutsphäre) in man, representing this, as an
apriori givenness (apriorische Gegebenheit), the necessary intention towards
an absolute Being and Value – independently from the different ways in which
man decides (consciously or rather unconsciously) to «fill» (ausfüllen) this
sphere (God or eventually a finite thing, converting this in an idol). We can
affirm that later, precisely with his main work, On the Eternal in Man, this
sphere assumes the connotation of the religious acts, characterized in a more
precise way, as it will be now analyzed 36.
We can thus see how Scheler calls the religious acts «forms of cons-
ciousness» or, in more general terms, «religious consciousness». In this re-
gard, it is important to point out again the fundamental difference between
Scheler’s position and Husserl’s. Husserl’s transcendental analysis was descri-
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36 Cfr. SCHELER, M., Absolutsphäre und Realsetzung der Gottesidee, GWX, Bern und München:
Francke Verlag, 1915-16.
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bing the act of consciousness immanently, ultimately leading back to its ope-
rative capacity the possibility of the appearance and significance of the world.
On the one hand Scheler also proceeded with an immanent description of re-
ligious consciousness; but on the other hand, as we will observe more deeply,
he also shows how the exhibition of the characteristics of religious acts neces-
sarily involves the reality and externality of the object as the cause of the acts
themselves – this is an argument for the realism Scheler desires. Thus, even if
phenomenological procedure as such does not ask about the reality of the in-
vestigated acts and their correlated objects, but rather researches their essen-
ce, particularly in the case of religious acts, a sort of methodological reversal ta-
kes place. Here it is a necessity to admit the reality of the divine as their
exterior cause, to fully comprehend their being, and in this sense, they cannot
be explained immanently: assuming the existence of God is indispensable to
clarify their inner dynamic.
Scheler distinguishes three essential characteristics of the religious act:
1) its intention is world-transcendence; that is, the correlated object of the in-
tentional, religious act, is a transcendence of anything finite or relative. This
does not mean that the religious act is not aroused by something contingent,
but that it cannot find its satisfaction in it. This concerns its second characte-
ristic: 2) the objective correlate of the religious intention is also infinite in its
meaning and value. Only the divine or the holy can fulfill his intention. This
would mean that where the religious act is directed to a finite object, it turns
out to be idolatry. As everyone possesses necessarily an intending towards the
absolute, a human being is a God-seeker, independently of whether he belie-
ves in God or not; Scheler says: «Every finite spirit believes either in a God
or in an idol». 3) The third characteristic consists in the possibility of the ful-
fillment of the religious act only through assimilation (Aufnahme) of the divi-
ne that reveals itself. The experience of the divine cannot be explained accor-
ding to Scheler through an objectification of an immanent experience, an
experience motivated by and in a person. For the same reason, the religious
act is not subjective, but rather is a personal response to the self-givenness of
the divine.
These premises assume that the religious act involves in its dialectic so-
mething that it cannot provide itself, so that the phenomenological, essential,
consideration has eventually to turn into religious knowledge. In other words,
phenomenology has to limit itself in showing the inner logic of the religious
act, which for its part opens up inevitably to the possibility of revelation. This
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is the pre-announced methodological reversal, because if the phenomenologi-
cal method in itself cannot raise the claim of deducing existence (Dasein) from
the knowledge of the essence (Sosein), in this case the existence or reality of
the cause of the acts is necessarily involved. This marks the difference between
a mere rational knowledge of God (metaphysics) and personal knowledge,
which is given in religion: «While for metaphysics the personhood of the Di-
vine forms a never-attainable boarder of knowledge, for religion this person-
hood is the beginning and end. Where it is not accessible to the eyes, thought,
believed, internally heard – there comes from religion, in the strict sense, no
speech» 37.
For these reasons, again, there is no way to «support» or to prove de-
ductively the efficacy of the experience of God: Scheler uses the German
term Aufweis to distinguish the right way to show or point out the reality of
revelation, which is different indeed from Nachweis or Beweis, which pro-
perly speaking mean a demonstration of something. This «personal reli-
gious knowledge», based on the objectivity of the facts that the phenome-
nological analysis brings to light (aufweis), pretends thus to overcome and at
the same time synthetize modern subjectivism and rationalism ruling in
matters of religion: just a personal experience (though not meaning subjecti-
ve experience) can reasonably («rationally») give an account of the religious
reality.
These last observations bring us back to the problem of revelation,
about which a last observation can be made. As said, the religious act invol-
ves necessarily in its logic the presence of the divine as its external agency. In
this sense, religious acts exhibit a sort of «impotency», showing that the pos-
sibility of the knowledge of God is not something that can be spontaneously
produced, but it is rather dependent on God’s possible, free, self-communi-
cation (Selbstmitteilung) – which would carry further to the problem of an
«election» or donation of grace; nevertheless, the precedent analysis on na-
tural revelation would show an alternative. As mentioned, positive revelation
means the experience of a wholly unique relation, as God communicates
himself through persons (der Heilige – the saint). The kind of revelation
found in natural religion is a generic one, and accessible to everybody, as God
is given in nature for all to see. Scheler refers explicitly to the words of Paul
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in Rom 1:20. The Apostle says: «For ever since the world was created, peo-
ple have seen the earth and sky. Through everything God made, they can
clearly see his invisible qualities – his eternal power and divine nature. So
they have no excuse for not knowing God». Thus, as the artist is knowable
through his art, God becomes knowable through his creation. In this regard
Scheler’s position is clearly Augustinian: his natural theology is based on the
possibility of an immediate contact between finite reason and infinite reason,
so that «omnia cognoscimus in lumine dei» 38 («we may understand everything in
the light of God»). According to Scheler, it concerns an originative Inten-
tionsrichtung («direction of intention») of man towards God, so that this
natural knowledge of God can be acquired by everybody, independently
of the degree of their own scientific-methodical education, to the extent that
the way this knowledge is achieved does not need be brought to clear cons-
ciousness in the reflection. In particular, this natural, religious knowledge en-
tails two axioms: 1) the intuition of a necessary, absolute Being, that «is» only
through itself and is given with every consideration of the «moments of con-
tingency» of nature or the soul; 2) the «value-character» or Kreatürlichkeits-
charakter («creaturely character») of every figure of nature, and the symbolic
«meaning» situated in the things themselves, the «pointer» that indicates
their creator.
It has to be stressed that Scheler’s phenomenology of religion leads to
these conclusions, which represent the two principal axioms of the system of
the natural theology he wants to establish, thanks to the phenomenological
examination of religious acts and the methodological employment of the prin-
ciple of religious self-evidence: it is precisely from that act and its internal lo-
gic that it is possible to see plainly, as the author affirms, «how there may
come into being a religious self-evidence which, residing in faith, resides in
itself, and how religion proceeds to unfold and throw out new and higher
structures in conformity with its own autonomous law» 39. The axioms pre-
sented by Scheler are for the philosopher religiously evident truths that can be
discovered in that kind of loving, «religious» attitude that his phenomenology
of religion encourages.
Making a last observation on this point, we can emphasize how Scheler’s
religionstheoretische Evidenz pretends to establish itself as the ultimate criterion
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of truth – or, with the words of Fernández Beites, it possesses a normative va-
lue 40: thanks to this principle alone it is possible to distinguish later between
authentic, non-authentic, illusional, adequate, non-adequate... religious expe-
riences (those experiences that William James, according to Scheler, was
«chaotically» listing, without being able to clearly distinguish their possible
validity). The alternative to this would be to introduce a principle external to
the religious sphere, and to measure natural religious forms according to it –
as the old rational theology was doing with its causal principle (i.e. the ratio-
nal proofs of God’s existence by Thomas Aquinas 41); or, to «prove» religion
on the basis of a preliminary moral norm (as it happens Kant’s philosophy), or
even, as in some pragmatic philosophical approaches, on the basis of the ge-
neral, spiritual, cultural products of an epoch and the eventual development of
its basic values. In any of these cases, starting for the premises exposed by
Scheler in Formalismus, according to which religious values (as the religious
acts) are at the basis of the values hierarchy, even the meaning of not-religious
values, as products of a spiritual culture, would be somehow diminished, if
they are not considered according to that kind of ultimate religious evidence
they bear in themselves («...wenn sie nicht um dieser Bedeutung willen, sondern
aus dem heraus anerkannt und geübt wird, was in ihr selbst an Evidenz und Sicher-
heit gelegen ist» 42).
4. CONCLUSION
Since Kant, and as the knowability of God was banished into the realm
of ethics, religious experience as such was denied access to a genuine philo-
sophical approach and therefore the possibility of being reasonably justified.
Phenomenology offered a way to newly investigate the «how» of phenome-
na’s givenness, and their proper modes of evidence. As seen, especially for
Scheler, criticizing the presentation of perceptual and categorial objects as the
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parameters of experience, and the presentative consciousness as its ultimate
judge, opened phenomenology to other modalities of givenness that could
offer a structural account of religious experience and knowledge. According
to this, calling for a principle of self-evidence in the religious sphere, Scheler
makes the claim for a new realistic phenomenological method that can provi-
de an autonomous grounding of religion and its essential, correlated expe-
rience, and found a new natural theology that has its basis in this specific ex-
perience.
Scheler’s method and phenomenology of religion can be designated as
realistic basically on two levels: firstly, trying to describe the unity of mea-
ning that determines religious acts as religious, Scheler involves in the in-
vestigation the externality and the necessary existence of the real «cause»
of these investigated «acts of consciousness» – which is the first givenness,
whence the phenomenological analysis starts. Secondly, his realism will
presume the inclusion of the origin and the ground of things and figures of
the world themselves, namely the «Creator», whose presence, according to
the philosopher, is necessarily given in any religious consideration of rea-
lity. In this regard, he speaks of natürlich religiöse Weltbetrachtung, «a natu-
ral religious observation of the world». In this sense, it can be affirmed that
Scheler’s phenomenology of religion is a philosophy of the presence, rather
than of the «present» understood as perceptual or epistemic unity, that the
mentioned «presentative consciousness» can intellectually grasp and orga-
nize according to its structures. This means that man has a natural open-
ness towards the Holy, that can be symbolically experienced in every figu-
re of nature.
All this is to raise the question at the end of his Wesenslehre der Religion:
Can we conclude the existence of God from an originary Intentionsrichtung
of man towards Him and from the fact that specific religious acts are part
of man’s natural equipment? Scheler went beyond the limits that Husserl
had methodologically imposed on his phenomenology, offering a modern,
but at the same time «traditionally» realistic way to think about the reality
of the religious objects. In accordance with the modern refutation of Tho-
mistic proofs, rejecting them as being based «on truths that are only truths
about the world», Scheler affirms that the existence of God has a qualitati-
ve difference from worldly objects that requires a distinct philosophical me-
thod, and there cannot be an analytical transition from one sphere of es-
sences to another. At the same time, however, he calls for a broader sense of
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«objectivity», which is not confined in the subjectivity of intentional acts –
claiming for the knowledge of an «intrinsically individually» but at the
same time «intrinsically universally valid truth» 43. So, an adequate cha-
racterization of religious acts can guarantee the authenticity and realism of
the religious object and is therefore fundamental for the establishment of the
philosophical autonomy of the religious sphere, and for the foundation of a
natural theology.
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